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UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
IANCU V. BRUNETTI
139 S. Ct. 2294 (2019)
Synopsis:
After being denied a federal trademark registration for the
trademark “FUCT”, Erik Brunetti brought suit challenging the
Lanham Act. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) states that a trademark is barred
from registration if it “consists of or compromises immoral … or
scandalous matter.” Brunetti argued that the bar on “immoral” and
“scandalous matter” violates the First Amendment. The Court held
that the bar violates the First Amendment because it discriminates on
the basis of viewpoint.
Facts and Analysis:
Under the Lanham Act, a federal trademark registration is not
required for a trademark to be valid.1 The owner of an unregistered
trademark may use the mark in commerce an even enforce it against
infringers.2 However, there are benefits of registering a trademark,
such as evidence of validity and constructive notice to the rest of the
world of who owns the trademark.3 Erik Brunetti, an entrepreneur, is
the founder of a clothing line called FUCT.4 The brand name and
trademark is not meant to be a word, but it is supposed to be spelt
out, as in F-U-C-T.5 Although it is not meant to be read, one is likely
to naturally read it, which causes the mark to be misinterpreted as
vulgar, immoral or scandalous.
After submitting the trademark registration, the Patent and
Trademark Office and the Patent and Trademark Trial and Appeal
Board determined that the section 1052(a) of the Lanham Act barred
Mr. Brunetti from obtaining a trademark registration for “FUCT”
1

Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2297 (2019).
Id. at 2297.
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 Id.
2
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because it was “total vulgar” and “therefore unregistrable.” 6 Mr.
Brunetti then filed an appeal with the Federal Circuit, in which the
court held that the bar of a trademark registration because of
“immoral or scandalous matter” is in violation of the First
Amendment.7 The Supreme Court of the United States then granted
certiorari.8
Beginning its analysis, the Supreme Court looked at a
previous holding, Matal v. Tam.9 There, the Court was looking at
whether Lanham Act’s ban on disparaging trademarks was
unconstitutional.10 The Court held that, “if a trademark registration
bar is viewpoint-based, it is unconstitutional.”11 In order to
determine whether “immoral or scandalous” are viewpoint-based or
viewpoint-neutral, the Court looked to the ordinary meaning and
dictionary definition of the words. 12 After looking to multiple
different sources of the meaning of the words immoral and
scandalous, the Court came to the conclusion that the Lanham Act
statute favors terms that are “aligned with conventional moral
standards” and disfavors terms that are “hostile” to those standards. 13
To further illustrate its point, the Court looks to past examples of
trademark registrations that had been denied on the grounds of
immoral or scandalous matter, and came to the conclusion that, “the
rejected marks express opinions that are, at the least, offensive to
many Americans.”14 Because of that conclusion, the Court
determined that these are viewpoint based and like in Tam, “a law
disfavoring ideas that offend discriminates based on viewpoint” and
is in “violation of the First Amendment.”15

6

Id. at 2298.
Id.
8 Id.
9 Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017).
10 Id. at 1765.
11 Id.
12 Iancu, 139 S. Ct. at 2299.
13 Id. at 2299-2300.
14 Id. at 2300.
15 Id.
7

Spring 2020

Legal Summaries

57

Holding:
Having decided that “immoral and scandalous matter” are
considered viewpoint based, the Court, sticking to precedent, held,
that because it is viewpoint based, it therefore violates the First
Amendment.16 The Court did go on however, mentioning that the
“immoral and scandalous” bar “is substantially overbroad.” 17 The
Court goes on to say that there are many swearwords in the world,
and even more immoral and scandalous ideas, and the fact that the
Lanham Act excludes all of them is too much.18 Thus, barring
trademark registration based on opinion or the viewpoint that the
words may offend the American people is a violation of the First
Amendment and therefore, that section of the Lanham Act is
unconstitutional.19
Impact:
Due to the fact that Brunetti had just been decided in this past
term, the impact on the future of trademark registration is not really
known. The Court seemed to be worried about how broad the
language of the Lanham Act was, encompassing anything that might
be considered “immoral or scandalous” to the average American.
There are still bars to getting a registered trademark, but this ruling,
without a doubt, narrowed the outer limits to the statutory bar.
Ultimately, this is a win for trademark owners who have had
trademark registrations denied in the past because of immoral or
scandalous matter, but only time will tell if trademark owners will
actually be able to get previous denied trademark registrations
approved under this new ruling.

16

Id. at 2302.
Id.
18 Id.
19 Id.
17
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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
KIDD V. THOMSON REUTERS CORPORATION
925 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 2019)
Synopsis:
After being denied for a job position, in which she was ranked
as the “top candidate,” Lindsey Kidd filed suit against Thomson
Reuters alleging that the background check provided by them
containing false information was in violation of the Fair Credit
Reporting Act (“FCRA”). Kidd alleges that the false information
cost her a job position when the CLEAR report sent to the Georgia
Department of Health falsely stated she had been convicted of theft.
The district court held, and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed that Thomson Reuters is not a consumer reporting agency
and therefore, not regulated by the Fair Credit Reporting Act.
Facts and Analysis:
The Fair Credit Reporting Act, also known as the FRCA, was
established in order to regulate the circumstances in which a
“consumer reporting agency may furnish consumer reports to third
parties, and the information contained in those reports.”20 The
typical consumer report is sold to third parties to determine lender
eligibility, credit scores, employment decisions, insurance coverage
and more.21 When a consumer reporting agency fails to comply with
the act, such as providing false information, that company may be
subject to civil liability resulting in actual and punitive damages. 22
This issue in this case is whether Thomson Reuters is considered a
consumer reporting agency in accordance with the FRCA.23

20

Kidd v. Thomson Reuters Corporation, 925 F.3d 99, 101 (2d Cir. 2019).
Id. at 101.
22 Id.
23 Id. at 103.
21
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Thomson Reuters is the owner and operator of a research
database known as Consolidated Lead Evaluation and Reporting, also
known as CLEAR.24 This database is home to numerous types of
information, such as, “motor vehicle records, court records, aliases,
the status of professional licenses, real property transactions, and
similar information.”25 The majority of CLEAR subscribers are
government and law enforcement agencies. 26 Thomson Reuters has
very strictly guidelines on what the information obtained from their
databases can be used for, and they explicitly state that the
information may not be used for anything related to or seemingly
related to the FRCA.27 They require their subscribers to commit, in
writing, that they will not use the information for purposes of the
FRCA, and if they are found in violation of these terms and
conditions, they account may be terminated. 28 Between 2012 and
2016, forty-six different subscribers were found to be in violation of
these terms, in which ten were terminated by Thomson. 29
In 2014, the Georgia Department of Health requested the data
of Ms. Kidd to help aid them in the determination of hiring her for a
job in which she was ranked as the top candidate. 30 Upon receiving
the background information, the report indicated that Ms. Kidd had
been convicted of theft, and because of this newly discovered
information, the Georgia Department of Health decided to pursue
options elsewhere, leaving Ms. Kidd out of a job. 31 Ms. Kidd filed
suit alleging that Thomson Reuters was in violation of the FRCA. 32
In determining whether Thomson Reuters is considered a consumer
reporting agency, the district court looked to the language of the
FRCA.33 The court determined that “an entity is a consumer
24

Id. at 101.
Id. at 102.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 Id. at 103.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Id.
25
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reporting agency under the Act if it regularly assembles consumer
information with a particular purpose or subjective intention –
namely, of providing it to third parties for the use in connection with
an FCRA-regulated end, such as employment eligibility.” 34 The
court went on to state that a consumer reporting agency is “an entity
that intends the information it furnishes to constitute a consumer
report.”35 The court essentially states that there is a specific intent
requirement for one to be a consumer reporting agency, and the court
looks to several other circuits that have also developed a similar
specific intent or purpose standard. 36 The district court held that
based on the text of the FRCA and how other circuits have
interpreted that text, that Thomson Reuters is not a consumer
reporting agency and therefore, not regulated by the FCRA. 37
Holding:
In determining whether or not the district court errored in its
decisions by stating that Thomson Reuters was not a consumer
reporting agency, the Second Circuit, like the district court, went
back and looked at the text of the FRCA.38 Similarly, they
determined that there was a specific intent requirement for the entity
to actually be considered a consumer reporting agency. 39 Looking at
all the facts in the record, the court determined that there was no
specific intent for Thomson Reuters to become a consumer reporting
agency, in fact, there was plenty of evidence to suggest the
opposite.40
The court went through all of the evidence such as the
extensive terms and conditions, the fact that on multiple occasions
Thomson Reuters would require commitments from their CLEAR
subscribers that they were not using the information for FRCA

34

Id.
Id. at 105.
36 Id.
37 Id. at 107.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Id.
35
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purposes, and the fact that Thomson Reuters had terminated accounts
that were found to be in violation of the terms and FRCA. 41 All of
this evidence strongly pointed that Thomson Reuters had no interest
and therefore, no specific intent to be a consumer reporting agency. 42
Thus, the court held that Thomson Reuters is not a consumer
reporting agency and is not regulated by the FRCA.43 The court
affirmed the district court’s decision of summary judgment on behalf
of Thomson Reuters.44
Impact:
The impact of this case seems reassuring, but at the same time
troubling. In this present case, it is reassuring, because Thomson
Reuters took extra steps and went above and beyond to make sure
that its CLEAR subscribers were not using the information obtained
in ways that would violate the FCRA. However, there is the potential
for other companies to not be as careful as Thomas Reuters had been
in this case, which opens the door for those companies not qualifying
as consume reporting agencies, thus, not subject to the FCRA, but
ultimately are violating the FCRA. This seems to be one of those
‘time will tell’ cases to see how wide of an impact it has. It appears
to be the type of case where one needs to sit back and watch it unfold
before they are able to make an determination in how it will impact
future cases.
KILGOUR V. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
942 F.3d 113 (2d. Cir. 2019)
Synopsis:
After being denied by the Securities and Exchange
Commission (“SEC”) for whistleblower rewards, petitioners, John
Doe, Colin Kilgour and Daniel Williams, appealed to the Second
41

Id.
Id.
43 Id.
44 Id.
42
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Circuit claiming that they were improperly denied their awards.
Under the Dodd-Frank Act, which was passed by Congress in 2010,
the SEC “shall pay an award or awards to 1 or more whistleblowers
who voluntarily provided original information to the Commission
that lead to the successful enforcement of a covered judicial or
administrative action.” Based on the statutory definitions of “original
information” and “leading to successful enforcement”, the SEC
denied petitioners claims stating that the information was not original
as defined. The Second Circuit upheld and affirmed the SEC’s
decision, denying petitioners their share of the rewards.
Facts and Analysis:
Under the Dodd-Frank Act, the SEC “shall pay an award or
awards to 1 or more whistleblowers who voluntarily provided
original information to the Commission that lead to the successful
enforcement of a covered judicial or administrative action.” 45
Original information is defined as “information not already known to
the Commission from any other source, unless the applicant is the
original source of the information.”46 Leading to successful
enforcement is defined as “information that (1) was sufficiently
specific, credible, and timely to cause the SEC to open, reopen, or
expand an examination or investigation leading to a successful
judicial or administrative action … or (2) concerned conduct that was
already under examination or investigation and its submission
significantly contributed to the success of the action.”47
Starting in June 2010, the SEC started to receive information
from Deutsche Bank (“DB”) employees claiming that DB “was
overstating the value of certain assets to improve the appearance of
DB’s financial performance to its shareholders, the market and the
investing public.”48 Shortly after this complaint was filed, John Doe
met with the SEC, in which he described the same information to the

45

Kilgour v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 942 F.3d 113, 114 (2d. Cir.
2019).
46 Id. at 113.
47 Id.
48 Id. at 114.
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Commission.49 Unlike the first Claimant, John Doe had difficulty
expressing himself to the Commission and seemed to be rather
disorganized.50 On multiple occasions, Doe had met with the
Commission to provide more information, but every time the
Commission determined that the information was duplicative of the
information they had already received from the first Claimant.51
In June 2013, a second Claimant submitted a report to the
Commission, which was very “detailed and comprehensive [and]
absolutely critical to the investigation.” 52 This report was written by
petitioners Kilgour and Williams.53 After this reported was
submitted and finalized, Claimant 2 gave permission to both Kilgour
and Williams to file for the whistleblower reward because they were
the authors of the report.54 In July 2016, the SEC accepted
whistleblower reward claims for claimant 1 and claimant 2, but
denied the claims of Doe, Kilgour and Williams for a lack of original
information.55 Petitioners appealed to the Second Circuit.56
John Doe’s main argument was that the SEC acted in a
capricious manner because they favored the information from
Claimant 2 over his.57 The court held that it was reasonable for the
SEC staff members to find that information Doe had provided was
not credible because he was extremely disorganized, and his
testimony was incoherent and jumbled.58 Meanwhile, Claimant 2’s
information was “consistent and critical information that led to the
successful enforcement action.”59 The court determined that the SEC
personnel reasonably believed that the information by Claimant 2

49

Id.
Id.
51 Id.
52 Id. at 115.
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 Id. at 120.
58 Id.
59 Id. at 121.
50
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was more helpful because of the way it was provided to them. 60
Therefore, the manner in which the SEC acted was reasonable and
not capricious.61
Kilgour and Williams’ main argument was that they were
entitled to whistleblower award because the information provided to
them by Claimant 2 was original information from a report written by
them.62 Dodd-Frank provides an original source exception, which
states, “the Commission will consider you to be an original source of
the same information that we obtain from another source if the
information satisfied the definition of original information and the
other source obtain the information from you or your
representative.”63 Here, petitioners argue that because they wrote the
report, they are the source of the original information.64 Both the
SEC and the Second Circuit disagreed, stating that this rule applies to
those that give information to another federal agency that then reports
it back to the SEC. Thus, the original person that provided the
information is the original source, not the middle-man federal
agency.65 Therefore, Kilgour and Williams are not entitled to
whistleblower rewards.66
Holding:
In determining that the petitioners were not entitled to collect
a whistleblower award, the Second Circuit upheld and affirmed the
decision of the Securities and Exchange Commission.67 The court
held that the Commission has the discretion to compare the sources
of information, even if the information is relatively similar.
Allowing this discretion gives room to the Commission to obtain the
more accurate and critical information necessary to complete its
60

Id.
Id.
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 Id.
61
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investigation.68 Additionally, the court held that the whistleblower
original source exception does not apply to those that help write the
report, but that the exception only applies to other federal agencies
acting as agents.69
Impact:
The most noticeable impact of this case is likely to fallout
from the second part of the holding. That is, the fact that those that
write a whistleblower report do not fall within the exception of
original information and are not eligible for whistleblower awards.
In this case, Kilgour and Williams argued that by not allowing them
to fall under this exception, it is likely to make all whistleblower
applications moot. Although the court did not agree with their
argument, it still leaves the question as to whether or not there are
any other exceptions to the original source rule. At this point, only
time will tell if other similar cases will be brought, which will help
shed more light on this original source exception.
OSI PHARMACEUTICALS, LLC V. APOTEX INC.
939 F.3d 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019)
Synopsis:
After its patent challenge to the Patent Trial and Appeal
Board was denied for obviousness, OSI Pharmaceuticals appealed to
the Federal Circuit arguing that because of the high failure rate of the
art, one ordinary skilled in the art would not be able to invent the
pharmaceutical in light of prior art. 35. U.S.C. § 103(a) requires that
in order for something to be patentable, it must not be obvious to an
ordinary person skilled “in a relevant field that could easily make the
invention based on prior art.” To summarize, if someone else who
also practices in the field would be able to make the invention based
on the prior art, then it is an obvious invention and is not deemed
68
69

Id.
Id.
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patentable. The court reversed the Patent Trial and Appeal Board’s
decision finding that, “a reasonable fact finder could not find a
reasonable expectation of success. The Board’s finding is thus not
supported by substantial evidence….”

Facts and Analysis:
Title 35 of the United States Code sets forth the rules and
regulations of Patent Law in the United States.70 The minimal
requirements of receiving a patent are patentable subject matter,
novelty, obviousness, and enablement. 71 Each one of these
categories serves an important function in determining whether an
invention, process or method is worthy of receiving a patent. OSI
Pharmaceuticals (“OSI”) appeal from the decision of the Patent Trial
and Appeal Board, in which the Board held that OSI’s patent
application was unpatentable because it was obvious in light of prior
art.72 The Board found that numerous articles and references
described parts of the patent application, though not all of aspects of
the application was found in any single reference.73
The Board found that the claimed combinations of the prior
art “would have provided a person of ordinary skill with reasonable
expectation of success ….”74 The Federal Circuit, examining each of
the articles and references that the Board used in making its decision,
determined that the articles did indeed reference what OSI was trying
to patent, but no single article contained all of the claims and a
combination of such articles would be required. 75 The court found

70

35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
35 U.S.C. §$ 101-112 (2012).
72 OSI Pharmaceuticals, LLC v. Apotex Inc., 939 F.3d 1375, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
73 Id. at 1377.
74 Id. at 1379.
75 Id. at 1382-84.
71
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that one of the articles was lacking efficacy data of the proposed
drug, and that all other prior art was silent on those deficiencies. 76
Therefore, the references contained no data or any other promising
information on the efficacy of the drug, which is evidence that one
skilled in the art would not reasonable expect to succeed. 77
Looking to the history of pharmaceutical companies trying to
manufacturer a drug that could treat small cell lung cancer, the court
found more than 1630 attempts in doing so.78 The court found that
once these drugs entered Phase II clinical studies, they were highly
unpredictable and had a failure rate of roughly 99.5%.79 The court
went on to state that because of his incredibly high failure rate, it was
not persuaded that one ordinarily skilled in the art could reasonable
expect to succeed when combining the prior art.80 Therefore, holding
that the patent application was not obvious.81
Holding:
After deciding that the patent application was not obvious
based on prior art, and that one ordinarily skilled in the art would not
have reasonable expectation of success by combining these prior art
references, the court reversed and remanded the Board’s decision. 82
The court said that because of the 99.5% failure rate and no efficacy
data, there is not substantial evidence to suggest one would expect to
succeed.83 However, the court clarified its holding by stating that,
“we do not hold today that efficacy data is always required for a
reasonable expectation of success. Nor are we requiring absolute
predictability of success.”84 The court went on, “we conclude only,
that on these particular facts, a reasonable fact finder could not find a
76

Id. at 1384.
Id.
78 Id. at 1383.
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Id. at 1385.
77

Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary

68

39-2

reasonable expectation of success.”85 Therefore, the Board’s finding
is not supported by substantial evidence.86
Impact:
The impact of this case is unlikely to be significant or
widespread, but it is further clarification of how 35 U.S.C. § 103
claims are handled. Previous section 103 cases have helped clarify
what the Patent Trial and Appeal Board should do with ambiguous
terms, and now this holding will help clarify what evidence is needed
to be considered substantial evidence to hold something as obvious or
not. In determining if something is obvious the Board now has to
determine all the relevant facts related to the prior art, including the
failure rate of the prior art, because if something has an incredibly
high failure rate, one cannot reasonable expect to succeed.
SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. V. ELMS 3DS INNOVATIONS,
LLC.
925 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2019)
Synopsis:
After its patent challenge to the Patent Trial and Appeal
Board was denied, Samsung Electronics appealed to the Federal
Circuit claiming that multiple patents belonging to Elm 3DS
Innovations were invalid because the claims were overbroad, and
they lacked nonobviousness. 35. U.S.C. § 103(a) requires that in
order for something to be patentable, it must not be obvious to an
ordinary person skilled “in a relevant field that could easily make the
invention based on prior art.” In other words, if someone else who
also practices in the field would be able to make the invention based
on the prior art, then it is an obvious invention and is not deemed
patentable. The court affirmed both of the Patent Trial and Appeal
Board’s decisions. First, the court held that although the Board’s
interpretation of “substantially flexible” was overbroad, it was a
85
86

Id.
Id.
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harmless error. Second, the patents were indeed patentable because
one who is skilled in the art would not have found the combination of
claims to be obvious, and thus, meets the nonobvious requirement.
Facts and Analysis:
Title 35 of the United States Code sets forth the rules and
regulations of Patent Law in the United States.87 The minimal
requirements of receiving a patent are patentable subject matter,
novelty, obviousness, and enablement. 88 Each one of these
categories serves an important function in determining whether an
invention, process or method is worthy of receiving a patent.
Samsung Electronics and SK Hynix (“Samsung”) appeal from the
final decision of the Patent and Trial Board where the Board found
that multiple patents held by Elm 3DS were patentable. 89 Samsung
challenged the patents claiming that the claim construction was
overbroad and that in light of prior art, the patented inventions would
be obvious.90
In order to determine the meaning of “substantially flexible”,
the Patent Trial and Appeal Board turned to the general-purpose
dictionary in order to construe its definition. Based on the dictionary,
the Board determined that substantially flexible means “largely able
to bend without breaking.”91 The Federal Circuit stated that by the
Patent Trial and Appeal Board construing the definition of
substantially flexible by using a dictionary, it lead to an overbroad
determination of the meaning of the phrase.92 Instead, the court said
that the Board should have construed it based on the “ordinary and
customary meaning they would have to one of ordinary skill in the art
in light of the specification and the prosecution history.” 93 In other

87

35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
35 U.S.C. §$ 101-112 (2012).
89 Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. v. Elm 3DS Innovations, LLC, 925 F.3d 1373,
1377 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
90 Id. at 1377.
91 Id. at 1378.
92 Id. at 1377.
93 Id.
88
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words, the Board should have construed it based on how someone
trained in that art would have construed it based on the meaning of
the patent application itself. The court held that although the
definition construed by the Board was overbroad, based on the
evidence, including the patent application itself and testimony from
Elm 3DS and its experts, the incorrect interpretation of substantially
flexible would not have changed the result and it was merely a
harmless error.94 Because of this, the court upheld the Board’s
decision.
Under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a), a claimed invention, process or
method must be nonobvious in light of prior art to one trained or
skilled in the particular or relevant field.95 That is, if someone else
would have believed the invention, process or method was obvious
just looking at the prior art, it is not deemed patentable. 96 Samsung
contends that the fabrication method disclosed would be obvious in
light of prior art, because the combination of two prior references
would achieve the same thing.97 According to the Board, Samsung
failed to explain “how [the] fabrication process would be
changed….”98 The Board “found that a person of ordinary skill in
the art would not have been motivated to make such a combination
and would not have had a reasonable expectation of success in doing
so.”99 On Appeal, Samsung claimed that “the Board improperly
required proof that unclaimed elements were combinable.” 100
However, the court stated that it is well-known that “obviousness
based on teachings from multiple references does not require an
actual, physical substation of elements.” 101 The court went on to
state that the only thing that matters in an nonobvious determination
is “whether a person of ordinary skill in the art, having all the

94

Id. at 1380.
Id.
96 Id.
97 Id. at 1381.
98 Id. at 1382.
99 Id. at 1381-82.
100 Id. at 1382.
101 Id.
95
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teachings of the references before him, is able to produce the
structure defined by the claim.”102
Holding:
After determining that Samsung’s argument, both for claim
construction and nonobviousness, were invalid, the Federal Circuit
upheld and affirmed the Patent Trial and Appeal Board’s decisions.
With regard to nonobviousness, the court held that Samsung’s
argument was too speculative to determine that the Board had errored
in its ruling for Elm 3DS.103 The court agreed with the Board, stating
that Samsung failed to meet their burden by stating the Board lacked
substantial evidence.104 The court ultimately held that there was
substantial evidence to support the Board’s findings.
Impact:
At this current time, due to how recently this case was
publish, the impact of the decision is not really known or even
speculated about. It is likely that this case will be used for future
precedent on how to construe specific terms and phrases within a
patent application. This decision will help shape the way the Patent
Trial and Appeal Board goes about defining words that are
ambiguous. The Board should now look to the ordinary and
customary meaning of the word within the art, instead of construing
it with the dictionary definition, therefore, preventing an overbroad
definition of the word. With regard to obviousness, this case affirms
the notion something is not obvious if a person with ordinary skill in
the art would not have been motivated to make a combination if they
had the reasonable expectation that they would not succeed.
SECRETARY OF LABOR, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR V. SEWARD
SHIP’S DRYDOCK, INC.
937 F.3d 1301 (9th. Cir. 2019)
102

Id.
Id. at. 1383.
104 Id.
103

72
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Synopsis:
After the fallout of an April 2009 incident, in which thirteen
violations of the Occupational Safety and Health Act (“OSHA”) were
reported, the Secretary of Labor and the Occupational Safety and
Health Review Commission disagreed on the interpretation of 29
C.F.R. § 1910.134(d)(1)(iii). This section “requires the employer to
identify and evaluate the respiratory hazard(s) in the workplace. To
perform this evaluation, the employer must make a reasonable
estimate of the employee exposures anticipated to occur as a result of
those hazards….” The Commission determined, unanimously, that
section 1910.134(d)(1)(iii) only requires an evaluation of respiratory
hazards when respirators are necessary to protect the health of the
employees. The Secretary of Labor, on the other hand, argued there
is no threshold requirement of necessity for employers to be required
to identify and evaluate the workplace conditions. Based on this, the
Ninth Circuit granted the Secretary’s petition for review of the
Commission’s decision.
Facts and Analysis:
Under section 1910.134 of the Occupational Safety and
Health Act of 1970, “a respirator shall be provided to each employee
when such equipment is necessary to protect the health of such
employee.”105 Furthermore, section 1910.134(d)(1)(iii) states, “the
employer shall identify and evaluate the respiratory hazard(s) in the
workplace.”106 For years, the Secretary of Labor had interpreted this
to mean that employers were required to “evaluate the respiratory
hazards at their workplaces whenever there is the potential for
overexposure of employees to contaminants, in order to determine
whether respirators are necessary to protect the health of the
employees.”107 The Occupational Safety and Health Review
Commission (“Commission”) disagreed with the Secretary’s
105
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interpretation of the statute and held that this section only applies
when respirators have already been determined as necessary. 108
Prior to this case, it has long been held that a court cannot
prefer one interpretation over another, and the court must use
deference when hearing these types of cases, unless the terms are
ambiguous.109 To determine whether a term is truly ambiguous, the
court “must carefully consider the text, structure, history and purpose
of the regulation.”110 “Doing so will resolve many seeming
ambiguities out of the box.”111
The court begins by looking at the text and structure of the
regulation.112 In order to help determine the meaning behind the
regulation, the court looks to the dictionary definition of the word
hazard. There, the court finds that the definition is “a thing or
condition that might operate against success or safety.”113 The court
finds that the definition of hazard is more aligned with the
Secretary’s definition because “might” and “potential” are
synonymous.114 The Commission, disagreeing, argued that there
must be a showing of “a significant risk of harm necessitating the use
of respirators.”115 The court held that the Commission’s
interpretation is incorrect based on the text of the statute because the
word “identify indicates that … the regulation applies even where an
employer does not already know of the hazards in the workplace.” 116
Moving on to the purpose and history of the regulation, the court
looks to the primary objective of the regulation.117 The court
determined that the primary objective is “to prevent atmospheric
contamination in order to prevent employees working in industrial
facilities from experiencing occupational diseases caused by
108
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breathing air contaminated….”118 Continuing, “to achieve this goal,
the Standard requires an employer first to put in place engineering
control measures, such as ventilation, as feasible. Only if those
measures are not feasible or are inadequate is the employer required
to use respirators.”119 The court found that based on the
Commissions interpretation of the Standard, an employer would only
be required to evaluate hazards after it becomes clear that employees
are being overexposed to contaminants.120 This is clearly at odds
with the text because the primary objective is to prevent exposure. 121
Therefore, holding that section 1910.134(d)(1)(iii) requires employer
evaluation for potential hazards.122
Holding:
After finding that the statutory text was ambiguous, and then
running through the text, structure, purpose and history of the
regulation, the Ninth Circuit held that that the Secretary’s
interpretation was the proper interpretation of the Standard. 123 The
court reiterated by stating that “the text, structure, purpose and
regulatory history of the Standard all point in the same direction.” 124
Thus, the court held that section 1910.134(d)(1)(iii) “requires an
evaluation of which, if any, respiratory hazards exist in the workplace
where there is a potential for overexposure of employees,” therefore,
remanding the case back to the Commission.125
Impact:
The most noteworthy impact of this case will likely be the
fallout on employers. After this decision, employers will have to be
118
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more cautious and proactive in checking the working conditions of
their employers. Employers will have to take a new approach and set
up new mechanisms to make sure they are taking the appropriate
actions before employees are subjected to overexposure of
contaminants. Going forward, the biggest winners from this decision
are the employees, and because of this, they will now have greater
access to health and safety devices, such as respirators.

ZUNIGA V. BARR
934 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 2019)
Synopsis:
After being denied the right to counsel at a fear determination
hearing, Baldemar Zuniga, a Mexican national, who illegally entered
the United States as a child, appealed to the Ninth Circuit. 8 U.S.C. §
1228(4)(b) states, “the alien shall have the privilege of being
represented (at no expense to the government) by such counsel,
authorized to practice in such proceedings, as the alien shall choose.”
Zuniga alleges that he did not properly waive his right to counsel,
and he was denied counsel at his hearing. The Court of Appeals
agreed with Zuniga, stating that the plain language of the statutory
text is conclusive of providing the right of counsel to the petitioner.
The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded back to the
immigration judge.
Facts and Analysis:
Title 8 of the United States Code lays out the federal law
dealing with immigration and nationality.126 Specifically, 8 U.S.C. §
1228 handles expedited removal of aliens convicted of committing
126
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aggravated felonies.127 In 2012, Zuniga was convicted of conspiracy
of money laundering and the manufacturing and distribution of
drugs.128 At this time, Zuniga testified in open court against his two
co-conspirators, who were part of the Knights Templar cartel. 129
Because Zuniga was convicted of a felony, he was placed in
expedited removal proceedings in accordance with section 1228. 130
During a routine interview with Immigration and Customs
Enforcement officers, Zuniga expressed fear of being removed to
Mexico based on retribution from cartel members for his testimony
against his co-conspirators.131 At this point, he was sent to an
asylum officer to determine if his fear was reasonable.132
During his interview with the asylum officer, Zuniga was
asked if he had an attorney, because it was his right to have an
attorney present for the interview.133 Zuniga told the officer that he
had an attorney for the reasonable fear proceedings, but that he was
willing to continue the interview without the attorney present. 134 The
officer agreed and proceeded with the interview. 135 At the end of the
interview, the officer determined that Zuniga did not have reasonable
fear of returning to Mexico and that the expedited proceedings should
continue.136 Under Title 8 U.S.C. § 208.31(f)-(g), a non-citizen “will
be afforded the opportunity for an expeditious review of the negative
screening determination by an immigration judge.”137 Because
Zuniga received a negative determination, he appealed to the
immigration judge, arguing that his fear was indeed reasonable. 138

127

Id.
Zuniga v. Barr, 934 F.3d 1083, 1084 (9th Cir. 2019).
129 Id. at 1084.
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 Id. at 1085.
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 Id.
136 Id. at 1086.
137 Id.
138 Id.
128

Spring 2020

Legal Summaries

77

During the hearing with the immigration judge, the judge
informed Zuniga that he had the right to counsel of his own choosing,
but the government will not pay for said counsel.139 He was
previously given a list of counsel for him to look at and select. 140
The judge then asked if he had counsel, and Zuniga responded that he
did not.141 After that, there was no more discussion about counsel
and the judge went on to question Zuniga. 142 The judge believed that
this was sufficient to constitute a waiver of counsel. 143 The
immigration judge found that Zuniga did not have reasonable fear
and upheld the asylum officer’s decision.144 Zuniga filed appeal to
the Ninth Circuit claiming that his due process rights were violated,
as well as the immigration judge had errored in determining his lack
of reasonable fear.145
On appeal, the government conceded to the fact that the
conversation between Zuniga and the immigration judge was not
sufficient as a waiver, but they do so because the government
believes that there was no statutory right to a counsel anyway, so an
ineffective waiver doesn’t matter.146
Holding:
The Ninth Circuit begins its analysis by looking at the plain
language of the statutory text.147 The court, after reading all of
sections 1228, 1229 and 1362, determine that that statute does indeed
state that there is a “statutory right to counsel in … removal
proceedings.”148 The court further states that all the above sections
read together, reinforces the notion that there is a statutory right to
139
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counsel.149 The court goes on to hold that, “the text of § 1228 is both
clear and consistent with the statutory scheme at issue, the plain
language of the statute is conclusive in providing a statutory right to
counsel.”150
In response, the government argued that a 1999 memo from
the Executive Office for Immigration Review gave the government
discretion in deciding whether or not a non-citizen had the right to
counsel.151 The court agreed with the government, but the agreement
was limited to the government have discretion only in the initial
reasonable fear interview, not on appeal for a negative determination
review.152 The court went on stating that the plain text of the statute
outweighs the interpretation from the Executive Office for
Immigration Review and Zuniga had the right to counsel.153 The
court reversed and remanded back to the immigration judge, without
answering the question as to Zuniga’s claim that the immigration
judge errored on determining his reasonable fear. 154
Impact:
The fallout of this case is unlikely to have a noticeable
impact, but in smaller settings, there is likely to have more immediate
impact. The ruling of this case essentially states that the 1999 memo
by the Executive Office for Immigration Review is invalid, holding
that non-citizens do have a statutory right to counsel and it’s no
longer at the discretion of the government. Because of this, noncitizens will now be afforded this right, which is only a benefit for
those trying to appeal a negative decision from an asylum officer.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS
HAYNES V. KOHL’S DEPARTMENT STORES, INC.
391 F.Supp.3d 1128 (S.D. Fla. 2018)
Synopsis:
After unsuccessfully being able to access Kohl’s Department
Store’s website because its website was incompatible with screenreading software, Dennis Haynes filed suit alleging that Kohls has
violated Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”).
The court held that Mr. Haynes did in fact state a claim under Title
III of the ADA and Kohl’s Department Store’s motion to dismiss was
denied.
Facts and Analysis:
Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act states, “[n]o
individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in
the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities,
privilege, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public
accommodation by any person who owns, leases, or operates a place
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of public accommodation.”155 The issue is whether or not a website
is considered a place of public accommodation. Mr. Haynes “is blind
and therefore unable to engage in and enjoy the major life activity of
seeing, constituting a disability as defined by the ADA.” 156 Mr.
Haynes argues that he is unable to enjoy full access to the Kohl’s
website because numerous parts of the website, including graphics,
links, headings and other information are not readable because it is
not compatible with his screen-reading software. Kohls argues that a
website is not protected by Title III of the ADA, and in the
alternative, if it was protected under the ADA, then Kohls need not
comply because it would violate its due process rights. 157
In analyzing the first issue, whether a website must be made
ADA compliant, the district court looks to the precedent held by the
Eleventh Circuit.158 In Rendon v. Valleycrest Products Limited, the
Eleventh Circuit held that “Title III discrimination covers both
tangible barriers, that is, physical and architectural barriers that
would prevent a disabled person from entering an accommodation’s
facilities and accessing its goods, services and privileges and
intangible barriers that restrict a disabled person’s ability to enjoy the
defendant entity’s goods, services and privileges.” 159
The Eleventh Circuit went on to give a test on whether a
website is subject to the ADA, stating “websites are subject to the
ADA if a plaintiff can establish a nexus between the website and the
physical premises of the public accommodation.” 160 In order to do
this, the plaintiff must please facts that prove the “(1) Defendant’s
website provides access to a benefit of Defendant’s physical store,
and (2) Plaintiff was denied access to that benefit when he could not
access Defendant’s website.”161 Here, Mr. Haynes argued that
because the website was not compatible with his screen-reading
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software, he was unable to place orders online for in-store pickup, he
was unable to access a map of his nearby stores and he wasn’t able to
print coupons to be used in those stores.” 162 Accordingly, the district
court found that a nexus had been established between the online
website and the physical store.163 Therefore, there is a claim under
Title III.164
After establishing that Mr. Haynes had a Title III claim,
Kohls argued that the claim should be dismissed because it violates
its due process rights.165 Kohls argues that because there is no statute
implementing regulations that a website needs to be ADA compliant,
it violates their due process rights if they are held liable.166
Additionally, they argue that holding Kohls liable for not being
compatible with third-party software, in the absence of any
regulations, is also a violation of their due process rights. 167 With
regard to Kohls’ first argument, the district court finds this
unpersuasive because of the Rendon opinion that is sixteen years old
at the time of this case.168 The court states that Rendon gave the
defendant ample notice that websites can fall within the scope of
Title III.169
Next, the court looks to the definition of discrimination under
Title III of the ADA. Here, the court outlines that the act specifically
outlines that a “failure to take such states as may be necessary to
ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied
services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other
individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services.”
The court takes aim at the “auxiliary aids and services” language of
the statute and upon further examination, “auxiliary aids and
services” include “screen reader software.” 170 The court agrees with
162
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the defendant that there is no guidance on making their website ADA
compliant, but it goes on to state that it is abundantly clear that a
website needs to be ADA compliant.171 The court points out that this
is flexibility built into the statute to make it easier for websites to
become ADA complaint.172 Thus, holding that making a website
ADA complaint is not in violation of the defendant’s due process
rights.173
Holding:
After determining that Mr. Haynes had a valid Title III claim,
and that the claim did not violate the defendant’s due process rights,
the court went on to deny Kohl’s motion to dismiss. 174 The court
determined that Mr. Haynes had pleaded sufficient facts to warrant a
claim under Title III and it should go to a trier of fact to determine if
Kohls had indeed breach the ADA.175 Lastly, the court found that
Kohls had failed to establish a claim for violation of due process
rights, and because of that, their motion to dismiss was denied. 176
Impact:
Going forward, this case is likely to open the door for more
cases with similar situation facts. As the world moves to a more
digital world, away from the physical, it is only a matter of time until
the ADA will likely be amended to address the changes of
technology and the future. The Eleventh Circuit test of requiring a
nexus between the physical place of accommodation and the website
will likely be pushed to the limits as more and more retail shops close
their doors and transition to the only the digital space. Only time will
tell, but this case is likely to the be the first of many more to come.
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